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RASUL V. BUSH,

124 S. CT. 2686 (2004)
FACTS
In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress
enacted an initiative to use force against the responsible groups.' Soon after,
President George W. Bush acted on the resolution and commenced military
operations against the Al Qaeda and Taliban regimes in Afghanistan.2 The
United States kept many of the foreign prisoners taken during these
operations at its naval base (Base) in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.3 According to
the lease on the land, both Cuba and the United States have agreed that the
United States exercises full jurisdiction and control over the specified area,
so long as the United States does not leave the Base.4
Petitioners in this case, which included two Australian citizens and
twelve Kuwaiti citizens, never received a trial and had been held at the base
since early 2002. 5 That same year, they filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia and argued that their detention at
the Base was illegal. 6 The plaintiffs sought the federal court's jurisdiction
under the federal question statute7 and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 8, and
challenged their imprisonment through the federal habeas corpus statute. 9
The District Court, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson v.
Eisentrager °, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the
petitions.
In Eisentrager, 21 German citizens filed for habeas corpus in a
federal district court after having been captured by the United States in
China, tried and convicted of war crimes, and detained at a prison in
occupied Germany." The case came to the Supreme Court, which denied
district court jurisdiction after looking at six facts concerning whether the
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28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980) (granting original jurisdiction to district courts in cases involving "all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
9
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) (allowing aliens to sue for "an actionable 'tort ... committed in
").
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States ....
9
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1966) (allowing that "writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit within their respective jurisdictions.
...."the writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless ....He is in custody in
In addition,
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States").
10 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that aliens detained in territories outside
the United States' control could not file a habeas corpus petition).
I I Id. at 765.
6

7

Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L. J.

[Vol. 11:241

prisoners 1) were enemy aliens; 2) had been in the United States; 3) were
captured and held outside United States territory; 4) received a trial in front
of a commission outside the United States; 5) committed war crimes outside
the United States; and 6) were imprisoned outside the United States at all
times. 12 The primary reasons for dismissal in Eisentrager were that the
prisoners had already been tried and convicted
as enemies and had been
3
detained outside United States territory.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia cited Eisentrager
4
in affirming the District Court's decision and dismissed the complaints.'
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and considered the
following two issues: whether the habeas corpus statute gave the district
court jurisdiction over alien detainee cases at the Base, and whether the
federal question
statute and the Alien Tort Statute precluded district court
15
jurisdiction.
HOLDING
The Court ruled that the federal habeas corpus statute gave
jurisdiction to the district court. 6 Furthermore, the Court found that neither
the federal question statute nor the Alien Tort Statute barred the district
court's jurisdiction. 7
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court began its analysis by rejecting the respondents'
arguments that Eisentrager was controlling precedent and that Congress
never expressly intended for § 2241, the federal habeas corpus statute, to
apply outside United States territories.' 8 In addition, the Court concluded
that the district court had jurisdiction under § 2241 to hear plaintiffs' claim
that their federal detention violated United States laws. 9
The respondents initially argued that Eisentrager was sufficiently
similar to the instant case to act as controlling precedent. 20 However, the
Id. at 777.
Id. The Supreme Court concluded that application of the facts to these six factors outweighed
the detainees' constitutional right to due process, and denied federal jurisdiction. Id. at 781.
14
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777-78.
15 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690.
16
Id. at 2691-92.
17 Id.
IS
Id. at 2693.
'9
Id.
20
Id.
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13

2005]

Rasul v. Bush

Supreme Court concluded that unlike the prisoners in Eisentrager,the Rasul
detainees: 1) were not from countries at war with the United States; 2)
denied participation in acts against the United States; 3) were never
convicted of or tried for wrongdoing; and 4) were imprisoned in a territory
over which the United States had exclusive jurisdiction. 21 The Court's ruling
on these distinctions contributed to weakening Eisentrager's value as
precedent.22
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the holding in Eisentrager
only applied to the constitutional right to habeas corpus in Article I, not the
habeas corpus statute.23 More specifically, there were a string of three cases
that the Court assessed: Ahrens v. Clark, 24 a 1948 decision which dealt with
the habeas corpus statute, Eisentrager,and Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Ky.,25 a 1973 decision which dealt with the habeas corpus statute.
In Ahrens, 120 German detainees who held been held in New York
petitioned for writ of habeas corpus in the District of Columbia.2 6 The Court
denied the petition, concluding that federal jurisdiction required the
prisoners' physical presence in the federal court's jurisdiction under the
habeas corpus statute. 27 Two years later, the EisentragerCourt concluded
that there was no federal jurisdiction because historically, "executive power
over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been
deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time security. '' 28 In
addition, Eisentrager implicitly followed the habeas corpus statute
interpretation in Ahrens in denying federal jurisdiction.29
After Eisentrager,Braden addressed the question of when a prisoner
held in an Alabama prison had a right to a speedy trial after subsequently
being indicted in Kentucky. 30 The petitioner petitioned for writ of habeas
corpus in Kentucky after he was under indictment for three years.3 1 The
Court noted that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner
who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be
unlawful custody. 3 2 Therefore, in contrast to Ahrens, the Braden Court
ruled that under the habeas corpus statute, federal jurisdiction required only
21
22
23

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 189.
Id. at 192.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 774.
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2694.
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 485 (1973).
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Id. at 494-95.
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that the court can serve notice upon the custodian who holds the prisoners.
In short, the Court concluded that because Braden overruled Ahrens, and
Eisentragerused the statutory interpretation in Ahrens, Eisentrager
could not
34
preclude federal jurisdiction under the habeas corpus statute.
The respondents also argued that Congress never expressly included
extraterritorial affairs under § 2241, and therefore the statute did not apply to
the plaintiffs.35
The Court considered the United States lease on
Guantanamo Bay and concluded that "by the express terms of its agreements
with Cuba, the United States exercises 'complete jurisdiction and control"'
over the naval base.36 The only way the United States could lose control
would be to abandon the land.37 Furthermore, because the habeas corpus
statute does not distinguish Americans from alien detainees, the Court
38
concluded that citizenship would have no effect on jurisdiction.
Guantanamo Bay therefore represented a territory within United States
jurisdiction and acts occurring there were subject to § 2241.
In addition to their claim under the habeas corpus statute, the
petitioners claimed that both the federal question statute and the Alien Tort
Statute granted jurisdiction to the federal district court. 4° The Court then
considered the reasoning used by the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the
federal question jurisdiction and ATS claims based on the limitations
imposed by the habeas corpus statute under the Court's interpretation in
4 1 In doing so, the Court
Eisentrager.
focused on two sources: case law
(Eisentragerand related precedent), and statutory language (ATS).42
First, the Court found that nothing in Eisentrager or any related
precedent specifically excluded "aliens detained in military custody outside
the United States" from litigating their cases in the United States 43 Secondly,
the Court found that the ATS "explicitly confers the privilege of suing for an
actionable 'tort... committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States' on aliens alone." 44 Therefore, the federal district court
would have jurisdiction in this case because the plaintiffs were not precluded
33
34
35
legislation
36

37
38
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Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2695.
Id.
Id. at 2696. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)(ruling that
has no extraterritorial effect unless Congress clearly shows this intent).
Rasul, 124 S.Ct. at 2696.
Id. at 2690-2691.
Id. at 2696.
Id. at 2698.
Id.
Rasul, 124 S.Ct. at 2698.
Id. at 2698-99.
Id. at 2698.
Id. at 2699.
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from access to federal courts under federal question jurisdiction and were
granted jurisdiction under the ATS.45
CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Kennedy did not agree with the majority that Braden
46
overruled Ahrens, the statutory predicate to Eisentrager.
Instead, he
examined how the Eisentrager court reached its decision to deny federal
jurisdiction.4 7
Kennedy based his concurrence solely on the factual
48
differences between this case and Eisentrager.
He concluded that
Eisentrager established a 9eneral test that would grant federal jurisdiction
under the facts of this case.
DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Scalia, dissenting, writing for Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, initially argued that the statutory language in the habeas
corpus statute clearly shows that prisoners who are "not located within the
territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court" should not receive federal
jurisdiction. 50 He then addressed the alternative explanations for granting
federal jurisdiction offered by the majority and concurrence.5 1
Scalia warned that applying the
facts in this case to the factors in
52
Eisentragerwould create uncertainty. The opinion specifically noted that
threats to national security require decisive action.53 As a result, spending an
excessive amount of time distinguishing each potential case from

45

Id.

46

Id.

47
48

Id. at 2699-700.
Id. at 2700.

49
Id. ("A necessary corollary of Eisentrageris that there are circumstances in which the courts
maintain the power and the responsibility to protect persons from unlawful detention even where military
affairs are implicated").
50
Id. at 2701. As Justice Scalia noted, the habeas corpus statute "requires that '[t]he order of a

circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint

complained of is had.' 28 U.S.C. 2241(a) (emphasis added)." Id. Scalia argued that the italicized words
show legislative intent that "some federal district court have territorial jurisdiction over the detainee...
Guantanamo Bay detainees are not located within the territorial jurisdiction of any federal court. One
would think that is the end of this case." Id.
51
Id. at 2702.
52
Id. at 2705 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53

1.1
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Eisentragercould very well undermine the public interest in bringing alleged
enemies to justice. 4
The dissent then argued that Braden could not have overruled the
statutory predicate to Eisentrager because the cases were unrelated."
According to Scalia, the majority failed to recognize that Braden never
mentioned Eisentrager,or that the two cases established different rules for
different circumstances.56 Braden dealt with American citizens detained
overseas, while Eisentragerdealt specifically with foreign detainees.5578 As a
result, the dissent argued, the two cases had no bearing on each other.
As for the majority's argument that Braden made Eisentrager
inapplicable by overruling Ahrens, Justice Scalia argued that the Braden
decision was too narrow to affect Ahrens.59 He pointed out that Braden
involved a very specific situation where the petitioner successfully sought
habeas in Kentucky to challenge his legal confinement (through his
indictment in Kentucky), not his physical confinement in Alabama, which
was the issue for both Eisentragerand the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay. 6°
As a result, according to the Justice Scalia, the Ahrens
rule still applied, and
6
would not undermine the applicability of Eisentrager.1
The dissent rejected the majority's argument that the lease over
Guantanamo Bay granted the United States sufficient federal jurisdiction.62
Justice Scalia argued that despite the lease, Cuba and the United States
"explicitly recognized 'the continuance of ultimate sovereignty of the
Republic of Cuba over the [leased areas].' , 63 Based on this reasoning, the
majority did not meet its burden of showing how the United States' inferior

54
Id. ("[Tlhe Executive would be unable to know with certainty that any given prisoner-of-war
camp is immune from writs of habeas corpus. And among the questions this approach raises: When does
definite detention become indefinite? How much process will suffice to stave off jurisdiction?").
55
Id. at 2705.
5
Id. at 2704 ("Braden dealt with a detainee held within the territorial jurisdiction of a district
court, and never mentionedEisentrager.") (emphasis in original).
57
Id. at 2705-06.
58
Id. at 2705-06 ("'With the citizen,' Eisentragersaid, 'we are now little concerned, except to set
his [the citizen's] case apart as untouched by this decision and to take measure of the difference between
his status and that of all categories of aliens."') (emphasis in original).
59
Id. at 2704-05.
60
Id. at 2704. ("Braden stands for the proposition ... that where a petitioner is in custody in
multiple jurisdictions within the United States, he may seek a writ of habeas corpus in a jurisdiction in
which he suffers legal confinement, though not physical confinement, if his challenge is to that legal
confinement... Where, as here, present physical custody is at issue, Braden is inapposite, and Eisentrager
unquestionably controls.")
61
Id. at 2705-06.
62
Id. at 2707.
63
Id. at 2708 (citing Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba,

Art. Ill, T.S. No. 418).

2005]

Rasul v. Bush

right to the land could trump Cuba's ultimate sovereignty and grant federal
jurisdiction. 64
Finally, the dissent used the statutory language in § 2241 to make the
detainees' arguments under federal question jurisdiction invalid.65 More
specifically, Justice Scalia argued that federal courts would grant jurisdiction
to aliens only if their detention location was within the United States. 6 He
concluded that because the military kept the detainees at Guantanamo Bay
(over which Cuba exercised ultimate sovereignty), no right to federal
jurisdiction existed.67
CONCLUSION
In the short term, this ruling protects innocent-until-proven-guilty
foreign detainees from federal courts that may be overeager to dismiss these
cases in the wake of the traumatic September 11 attacks. The majority
maintained that the government had imprisoned the detainees for two years
without even giving them the chance to challenge the justification for their
detainment.68 In fact, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion points out that
"the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are being held indefinitely.' '69 While the
government should naturally seek justice and deter terrorists from harming
innocent citizens, this case would help make the United States more
accountable for what could amount to unjustified military retribution.7 °
Rasul seems to expand habeas corpus from national to international
boundaries. However, the question remains as to whether the Court
overextended federal jurisdiction in protecting detainees' interests. The
dissent points to two ways in which the Court may have set a dangerous
precedent in liberally construing precedent and statutory language: the fact
that Braden, which involved domestically held prisoners, "overrules the
statutory predicate" to Eisentrager,and the conclusion that the Guantanamo
64

Id. ("The Court does not explain how 'complete jurisdiction and control' without sovereignty

causes an enclave to be part of the United States for purposes of its domestic laws.")
65
Id. at 2707-08.
66
Id. at 2708.
67 Id. at 2710 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In Eisentrager... its [the Court's] analysis spoke
more broadly: 'We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens... only
because permitting their presence in the country implied protection . . . .' That reasoning dooms
petitioners' claims under § 1331 .... ")(citing Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 777-78).
68 Id. at 2698 n.15.
69 Id. at 2700.
70 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Indefinite detention without trial or other proceeding presents
altogether different considerations. It allows friends and foes alike to remain in detention. It suggests a
weaker case for military necessity and much greater alignment with the traditional function of habeas
corpus").
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Bay treaty clearly gives federal courts extraterritorial jurisdiction under §
2241. 7
First, the Court may have stretched related precedent by fitting
Braden into its reasoning.72 The dissent concludes that "for the Court to
reach the result it desires today. .. it must either argue that our decision in
73
Braden overruled Eisentrager, or admit that it is overruling Eisentrager."
Even the concurring opinion agrees, and recommends an emphasis on the
factual distinctions between Braden and Eisentrager before endorsing the
majority's ultimate conclusion.74
More specifically, Braden involved a prisoner indicted in Kentucky
and detained in Alabama, which made federal jurisdiction more clear-cut
than in Rasul.7 5 By ignoring the distinction between the two cases, future
federal courts might focus on the habeas corpus petitioner's status as a
prisoner instead of his actual proximity to a district court.
In any event, overruling Eisentrager establishes a potentially
dangerous standard that would encourage future federal courts bent on
expanding jurisdiction to overrule valuable precedent recklessly. 76 The
ruling could limit future federal courts' ability to call on Eisentragerin times
of war when convicted enemies have already had their day in court and
might not deserve another opportunity to be heard.
The second point seems to greatly expand habeas corpus jurisdiction
to detainees held at overseas military bases over which the United States may
not have complete control.77 The court holds that the United States need not
possess "ultimate sovereignty" over a territory to invoke federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction. 78 In this case, though Cuba maintains a reversionary
right over Guantanamo Bay, the reversion occurs only after the United States
decides to leave the naval base. 79 Foreign detainees would benefit through

71
72

Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. ("The Court's contention that Eisentrager was somehow negated by Braden . . . is

implausible in the extreme").
73

Id. at 2703.
Id. at 2699 ("As he [Scalia] explains, the Court's approach is not a plausible reading of Braden
or Johnson v. Eisentrager").
75
Id. at 2704 ("Braden dealt with a detainee held within the territorial jurisdiction of a district
court, and never mentioned Eisentrager").
76
Id. at 2699.
77
Id. at 2701 ("The Court today holds that the habeas statute ... extends to aliens detained by the
United States military overseas, outside the sovereign borders of the United States and beyond the
territorial jurisdictions of all its courts").
78
Id. at 2696.
79
Id. ("By the express terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises 'complete
jurisdiction and control' over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control
if it so chooses").
74
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this expanded jurisdiction when imprisoned in bases held under leases
similar in language to the Guantanamo Bay agreement.8 °
On one hand, if the government seeks to protect detainees and grant
expansive federal jurisdiction, it may want to include terms similar to the
Guantanamo Bay treaty when leasing future properties outside the United
States 8' On the other hand, the government may want to aggressively pursue
retaliatory military operations without judiciary involvement. Implementing
such a policy may require checking the terms under which the United States
controls each of its prisons and bases before deciding where to detain
prisoners. 82
Overall, Rasul raises valid concerns that "the Court boldly extends
the scope of the habeas statute to the four corners of the earth., 83 Granting
federal jurisdiction could give potential enemies an unwarranted second
chance to escape punishment, while overburdening the United States court
system. Furthermore, broader jurisdiction may undermine the military's
operations in Afghanistan. 84 United States soldiers may have a disincentive
to hunt terrorists aggressively, knowing that it may take years in a federal
85
court before they can bring prisoners to justice.
However, it appears that the Court has placed the appropriate limit
on its ruling. Part of the majority's analysis focused on factual distinctions
between Rasul and Eisentrager. Unlike the Rasul plaintiffs, 8 6 the
government imprisoned the detainees in Eisentrager after trying and
convicting them in formal proceedings.87 This distinction indicates a
willingness to apply the ruling to detainees who have not had the chance to

so Id. "The fact that extraterritorially located detainees lack the district of detention that the
statute requires... frees them to petition wherever they wish-and, as a result, to forum shop. For this
Court to create such a monstrous scheme in time of war.., is judicial adventurism of the worst sort." Id.
at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81
Id. at 2696.
For example, if the objective is to deny prisoners access to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction,
82
the United States may want to keep foreign detainees at bases where it has less jurisdiction than in
Guantanamo Bay. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2004) ("Military authorities faced with
the stark choice of submitting to the full-blown criminal process or releasing a suspected enemy
combatant captured on the battlefield will simply keep citizen-detainees abroad").
83
Rasul, 124 S. Ct.. at 2706.
4
Id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's carefree court disregards... the dire warning in
Eisentrager: 'To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across
the seas for hearing .... Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.
... Also, a potential separation of powers issue arises in times of war, which could include the post
9/11 operations in Afghanistan: "From this point forward, federal courts will entertain petitions from
these prisoners ...forcing the courts to oversee one aspect of the Executive's conduct of a foreign war."
See U.S CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for the President's Commander in Chief powers).
85
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
SId.
at 2693.
87
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777.
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defend themselves, thereby using judicial resources only when the habeas
corpus petititioners have exhausted their due process rights. Even with this
limitation, the ruling gives the government an incentive to be more
accountable for its actions, while opening the door to federal court for
innocent foreign detainees wrongfully captured and held by an overzealous
military. The dissent's silence regarding these policy considerations appears
to weaken its argument that
the majority cannot distinguish Rasul based on
88
the factors in Eisentrager.
Despite the ruling's positive implications for foreign detainees, the
question still remains as to whether or not they will receive a fair trial once a
court has taken jurisdiction. The majority emphasized that "what is presently
at stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the
legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who
claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing. ' ,89 However, more broadly,
constitutional due process requires not only notice and a date in court, but
also a sufficient opportunity for the plaintiff to be heard. 90 Only time will
tell whether Rasul represents a step towards moderation in the war on
terrorism or a trapdoor into a deeper judicial conundrum.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Taeho Lim

88
Rasul, 124 S.Ct. at 2705 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Justice KENNEDY ... thinks it [the
holding in Eisentrager] makes jurisdiction under the habeas statute turn on the circumstances of the
detainees' confinement-including... the availability of legal proceedings and the length of detention ...
the Eisentragercourt mentioned these circumstances, however, only in the course of its constitutional
analysis, and not in its application of the statute").
89
Id. at 2699.
90 Muihane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

